How does location based matching work on a dating site or app?
The platform stores a location for each member, finds other members within a chosen distance, and shows the results with an approximate distance. Members set how far they are willing to look, usually as a radius in miles or kilometres.
Location is one input among several. The search also applies age range, the niche, preferences and who the member has already seen. See our guide to dating search and matching algorithms for how those fit together.
For most members, "near me" is close to a requirement. A match several hours away is rarely a real match. That makes location one of the most useful things a dating product holds, and one of the most sensitive.
Where does a member's location come from?
It comes from the device, from what the member types in, or from the internet connection. Each source has a different level of accuracy, and more accuracy is not always better.
| Source | How accurate | What to know |
|---|---|---|
| Device location, precise | Android says usually within about 50 metres, and sometimes within a few metres | Needs permission. Far more precise than dating needs. |
| Device location, approximate | Android says within about 3 square kilometres | Needs permission. Enough for "people near you". |
| Postcode or town entered by the member | A district or a town | No device permission needed. Common on dating websites. |
| Internet connection (IP address) | Coarse and sometimes wrong | A fallback, not a basis for showing distance. |
On Android, the member decides. Google's developer guidance says that if someone grants only approximate location, the app gets approximate location whatever it asked for, and that the app should still work. It tells developers to include the precise permission only if the app benefits from it.
A dating product can run well on approximate location or a postcode. Collect the least precise location that does the job.
What can go wrong when a dating app shows distance?
Someone can use the distance feature to work out where a member is. Hiding the map pin is not enough if the server still calculates from an exact position.
In July 2024 TechCrunch reported on research from the Belgian university KU Leuven, which analysed 15 popular dating apps. Six of them (Badoo, Bumble, Grindr, happn, Hinge and Hily) had the flaw. The apps did not display exact locations, but they used exact locations for the distance filter.
The researchers called the method "oracle trilateration". In plain terms:
- The attacker makes a rough guess at where the target is.
- They move their own reported position step by step until the target drops out of the "nearby" results.
- They repeat this in three directions. Each point where the target disappears gives a known distance.
- Three known distances are enough to calculate a position.
According to the report, most of the affected apps allowed a member to be located to about 2 metres. Grindr, which rounds coordinates to three decimal places, allowed about 111 metres, and the researcher quoted said that is "not sufficient" in rural or suburban areas.
The companies' responses are part of the story. Bumble said it resolved the issue after learning of it in early 2023, including on Badoo. Hinge said it took action after the report. Hily said it had introduced new geocoding. happn said it had an extra layer of protection beyond rounding, and the researchers agreed this made the technique ineffective. TechCrunch reported that Grindr had not changed its approach and noted that its members can turn off distance display.
For a wider view of the risk, see our guide to stalking prevention for dating platforms.
How should a platform protect members' locations?
It should make the exact position unavailable to every feature that another member can observe. Display rounding alone does not do that.
- Round or snap on the server, before anything else. Coarsen the stored position first, then use that coarse position for filters, sorting and display. This is the fix the KU Leuven research points to.
- Show bands, not precise figures. "Under 5 miles" gives away less than "1.3 miles".
- Limit location changes. The attack depends on moving a reported position many times. Slow it down and flag accounts that do it.
- Match rounding to the place. A grid that hides one person in a city may not hide them in a village.
- Let members hide distance entirely.
- Never send coordinates to the app or browser. If they are in the API response, they can be read, whatever the screen shows.
- Test it. Ask for a penetration test that includes location inference, not just the usual web checks.
What do the app stores require for location?
They require the app to work for people who refuse or limit location access. Both stores treat location as the member's choice.
Apple's App Review Guidelines say that where possible an app should offer alternatives for people who do not grant consent, and give the example of letting someone enter an address by hand if they decline to share location. They also say an app may not require people to enable system functions such as location services in order to access functionality or content.
On Android, the app must cope with approximate location, as described above, and background location is a separate permission.
For a dating app this means three things: offer manual location entry, do not block sign-up behind a location prompt, and do not ask for background access. Our guide to app store rules for dating apps covers the other store policies.
What does data protection law say about location data?
Location tied to an identifiable member is personal data, so you need a lawful basis, clear information and security. In the UK there are also specific location rules for communications networks under the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR), but they do not usually cover a dating app's GPS data.
The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) says PECR location data "does not generally include GPS-based location information from smartphones, tablets, sat-navs or other devices", because it is collected independently of the network. It adds that organisations using such data must still comply with data protection law. The ICO notes this guidance is under review following the Data (Use and Access) Act.
The PECR rules are still a good model for what to tell members. Under them, people must be told:
- What types of location data are processed.
- What the data is used for.
- How long it is kept.
- Whether it is passed to a third party.
They must also be able to withdraw consent at any time. Put the same four points in your privacy notice and your location prompt.
Location history can reveal a home, a workplace and a routine, so keep only the latest position unless you have a clear reason. Our guide to GDPR for dating sites covers lawful bases and retention. This page is general information, not legal advice.
What location controls should members have?
Members should be able to decide how their location is set, what others see and when it updates. Look for these controls on any platform.
- Set a location by hand, by town or postcode, without using device location.
- Choose approximate location on the device and still get a working search.
- Hide the distance shown on their profile.
- Hold a location while travelling, or pause updates.
- Withdraw location permission later without losing the account.
- Read a plain explanation of what is stored, at the moment they are asked.
These controls matter most to members with a reason to be careful, such as people leaving an abusive relationship and members of LGBTQ+ communities in places where being identified carries risk.
What should you ask a platform about location before you launch?
Ask how location is stored and calculated, not just how it is displayed. On a white label platform the provider builds and runs location search, so your job is to check it.
- Is the position rounded on the server before the distance filter runs?
- Are coordinates ever included in what is sent to the member's device?
- How precise is the distance other members see, and can a member hide it?
- How often can a member change location, and is rapid change flagged?
- Has anyone tested the platform for trilateration?
- Is location history kept, and for how long?
- Can members join with a postcode or town only?
- Where is location covered in the privacy policy and the data processing agreement?
Dating Partners, our sister company run by the same group as this site, runs the software and data protection for its partner brands, so these questions go to the platform, not to you as the partner. Put them to us as you would to any provider. Our member experience page describes how search works on our platform.
Questions
Should a dating app show distance at all?
Most members expect it, but it should be approximate and optional. Show a band or a rounded figure, let members hide it, and make sure the server never calculates from an exact position.
Is a postcode or town accurate enough for matching?
Yes, for most dating sites. A postcode area or town supports searches such as 'within 20 miles' without the platform ever holding a precise position.
Can members change their location to another city?
That depends on the platform. Some let members set a location by hand, which helps people who are moving or travelling. Ask how often it can be changed, because rapid changes are also how location attacks work.
Does location matching need background tracking?
No. A dating product only needs a location when the member is using it. Android treats background location as a separate permission, and a dating app should have no need to ask for it.
Is location data personal data?
Yes, when it relates to an identifiable person. The ICO says organisations that use GPS-based location from devices must comply with data protection law, even where the specific PECR location rules do not apply.
Sources
- TechCrunch: Bumble and Hinge allowed stalkers to pinpoint users' locations down to 2 meters, researchers say, checked 21 November 2026
- Android Developers: Request location permissions, checked 21 November 2026
- Apple: App Review Guidelines, checked 21 November 2026
- ICO: Guide to PECR, location data, checked 21 November 2026
- Dating Partners partner terms, checked 21 November 2026
What changed
- : First published. Replaces our older guide on geolocation and proximity matching.